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is strategy an illusion?

Karl Walling

Betts, Richard K. American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas of National Security. New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
2012. 367pp. $20

Richard Betts is one of the most distinguished strategists in the United States today. He is the Salzman Professor of War and Peace Studies and the director of the
International Security Policy Program at Columbia University. Not only has he
written five prizewinning scholarly books, but he has a wealth of practical experience in formulating and implementing U.S. national security policy and strategy.
He has served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church Committee), the National Security Council during the Carter administration in the
1970s, and on the National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission)
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
In American Force Betts synthesizes his scholarship and practical experience
in a book that is in part a collection of articles he has written since the end of
the Cold War and in part a kind of intellectual autobiography—a quasi memoir.
He tells the story of his transformation from being a Cold War hawk along the
lines of Senator “Scoop” Jackson into a post–Cold War dove, somewhere between
now–Secretary of State John Kerry and Congressman Dennis Kucinich. Some
might find this transformation inconsistent, but Betts is a political realist. The nature of the threat during the Cold War required national self-assertion. The end
of the Cold War made such assertion less necessary, but, Betts laments, American
political leaders rushed too hastily to fill a power vacuum, and this effort to glob
alize the American system was bound to produce a backlash.
For Betts, U.S. political leaders made two different kinds of strategic mistakes
in the aftermath of the Cold War, one resulting
Professor Walling served as an interrogator in the
from fecklessness, the other from recklessness.
U.S. Army from 1976 to 1980. After earning his BA
The Clintonites were feckless. As crises developed
in liberal arts from St. John’s College in Annapolis,
Maryland, in 1984, he completed a joint PhD with around the world and public pressure mounted to
the Department of Political Science and Commit“do something,” they became willing to intervene
tee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago
in Somalia and the Balkans and elsewhere but not
in 1992. Since 2000, following teaching and research
to do anything that might prove politically unpopappointments with Harvard University, Carleton
College, and the Liberty Fund, he has served at the
ular, that might cost or risk much in public opinion
Naval War College.
polls. The result was halfhearted compromises—
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enough presence to put Americans in uniform in
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harm’s way but not enough force for them to achieve anything decisive. Quoting
Clausewitz, Betts observes that “a short jump is certainly easier than a long one, but
no one wanting to get across a wide ditch would begin by jumping half-way.” Selfdefeating as such faintheartedness might be, Betts is much more incensed by the
recklessness he associates with the second Bush administration. Following Samuel Huntington and Walter Russell Mead, he worries about self-inflicted clashes
of civilizations arising from ambitions to remake the world order in the American image. This cure may often be worse than the disease, as it spreads disorder,
chaos, terror, murder, and even genocide throughout regions, the Middle East
especially. Hence, one of Betts’s best chapters consists of advice against preventive
wars, which rarely turn out well and usually compromise the legitimacy of the
instigator of the war. For Betts, preventive wars are almost always opportunities
well lost.
The reason lies in the most provocative and deeply theoretical chapter in the
book, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” If it is, many who teach at war colleges may need
to find a new line of work, so the question deserves careful attention. The chapter was first published as an article in International Security in 2000; Betts has
updated it to apply to the present. For Betts, strategy is meant to be the bridge
between policy and operations. In principle, national interest, grand strategy,
policy, strategy, operations, and even tactics are linked in a rational way, with
lower means serving ever higher ends. But is such a chain of cause and effect really possible when political leaders choose to use force as an instrument of policy?
Betts produces ten critiques of the very possibility of this sort of instrumental
rationality. These range from the difficulty in all wars of predicting what the
political result of using force might be to the possibility that nonrational psychological and cultural mind-sets may blind leaders to what actually motivates
them. These include cognitive constraints on the ability of anyone in war to
comprehend all its variables, especially when “nonlinear” dimensions need to be
factored into the strategic calculus; “goal displacement,” in which standard operating procedures of complex organizations become ends in themselves rather
than entirely changeable means of achieving strategic objectives; interaction with
the enemy; and “friction.” In the United States especially, they include democratic
pluralism, which makes it difficult to set a coherent policy or to tailor strategy to
it, and the need for compromise, which makes it highly likely that more than a
few political leaders will jump only halfway across Clausewitz’s ditch, thus failing
to achieve their objectives.
Betts attempts to “salvage strategy” by refuting each of these critiques, showing
they are at best partial and do not prove that strategy is impossible, but their cumulative weight makes him well aware that if anything can go wrong in strategy, it
often will, which makes him skeptical of those whose fecklessness or recklessness
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss2/10
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leads them too eagerly to follow Shakespeare’s Mark Antony in “cry[ing] ‘Havoc!,’
and let[ting] slip the dogs of war.” As much as anything, this explains why Betts
became a post–Cold War dove. You never know for sure where the dogs of war
will go. Hence, it would be folly to fight preventive wars. Betts is not a pacifist,
but he insists on restraint, which is not the same as isolation. There is so much
uncertainty that wars need to be avoided unless the stakes are extraordinarily
high and there is good evidence that a reasonable chance exists of return on the
investment of lives, treasure, prestige, and legitimacy. Strategy is not an illusion,
but we should avoid the delusion that it can ever be easy. When force is to be
used, however, Betts is a hawk. Concentrate force for decisive victory, preferably
a quick one, which is often the most humanitarian way to fight as well. Also, because of the cumulative weight of the critiques of the very possibility of strategy,
Betts insists on simplicity in planning. The fewer the parts in any plan, the less
chance there will be for friction among them. Above all, Betts wants his readers to
be mindful of stakes. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are threats, but
not of the same kind as the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany. The greatest threat in
the twenty-first century is likely to be of the same kind as in the twentieth century
—namely, great-power war—so prioritizing against potential peer competitors is
the essence of strategic prudence today.
In strategy, it seems, everything old is new again. Perhaps unintentionally,
Betts winds up sounding a great deal like Colin Powell. He has almost reinvented
the Powell Doctrine, blending caution against resorting to war with overwhelming force when war is chosen as an instrument of policy. At times he sounds like
a cheerleader for the Obama administration: “Don’t do stupid stuff.” But even
that administration has found it difficult to follow the all-or-nothing approach
of the Betts (aka Powell) Doctrine. Middle-range threats may require something
between all and nothing, like drone strikes and special operations, for example.
Middle-range threats—dare one say it?—may require more “flexible responses”
than Betts seems willing to endorse, though always with some risk that they
will be mere half-measures. That said, this book is a marvelous blend of theory,
historical cases, and social-science insight, the sort most war college professors
could only dream of writing. It merits careful study by all who labor to ensure
that strategy is not an illusion.
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